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AN ESSAY:  Bridging the “divide” between feminism and 
child protection using the discourse of international human 
rights
Sherrie L. Russell-Brown*
In Spring 2000, at a United Nations women’s human rights 
conference, several female participants wore large pink buttons with the 
word “mother” in the middle of a circle with a slash through it.  There was 
an issue with the Holy See’s representative to the conference.  However, 
seeing the buttons was unsettling.  It seemed to me to go too far to suggest 
that to be pro-women’s human rights meant one had to be anti-mother.  
That same Spring, when I mentioned in a meeting with a human rights 
organization my interest in gender and children’s issues, it was explained 
to me that the articulation of women’s and children’s human rights should 
remain separate.  For too long, women have been defined by their 
reproduction and child rearing.  I understood the explanation and the need 
for separate consideration of women’s and children’s human rights.  But I 
did not understand why I could not be concerned with both the human 
rights of women and the human rights of children.  Why was it “either/or” 
as opposed to “both/and?”
At the time of these two events, I was a recent graduate from 
Columbia Law School with a Masters of Law in Human Rights.  I did not 
remember my coursework treating women’s and children’s human rights as 
mutually exclusive, distinct and unrelated topics.  I was taken aback by the 
suggestion that they should be so treated and struggled to understand it.
Then, two years later, I was to participate in (and presented a 
version of this essay to) a workshop entitled, “Feminism & Child 
Protection: Tension & Possibilities.”  I was again faced with an issue that 
was never resolved to my satisfaction and remained troubling:  the divide 
between women’s and children’s rights.  It was still difficult for me to 
visualize the “divide.”
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I thought that perhaps race could be contributing to the perception 
that there is a divide, and that African-American women might have 
another perspective on the issue.  In July 2001, I submitted to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), in 
Geneva, Switzerland, a “Shadow Report” on the reproductive rights of 
women of color in the United States.1  Issues of the denial and obstruction 
of African-American women’s right to reproduce have always been, and 
remain, extremely important to me.  Before entering academia in 2001, I 
worked for the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy (now the Center for 
Reproductive Rights) in the hope that I could influence the mainstream 
reproductive rights regime to include in its dialogue the perspective and 
concerns of women of color, which perspective and concerns are not 
always in line with those of the majority.  It is in that context that I heard 
the workshop’s topic and found it difficult to isolate the rights of children 
from the rights of women.  There are those that are all too willing to 
separate African-American women from their children.  
My difficulty visualizing the divide may be the result of my 
position as an African-American woman and may also be a result of my 
academic background and research interests, i.e. human rights.  Generally, 
my interest is in the intersectionality of race and gender in the human rights 
context.  Specifically, I have an interest in issues related to health and 
human rights, humanitarian law, international criminal law, and labor law 
and human rights.  In these areas, the rights and concerns of women and 
children are at times inextricably linked because the rights of both are 
destroyed by the same evil.  Two examples are: 1) the AIDS pandemic in 
sub-saharan Africa, and 2) sexual violence in armed conflict.
As a result of the prevalent myth that having sex with a virgin can 
cure the disease, men in South Africa infected with HIV target “girl 
children, infants, and babies” for rape.2  Adult women are similarly 
targeted, but they are also exposed to HIV as a result of inequities in their 
relationships with their male partners and their inability to protect 
themselves by demanding and ensuring that their partners use condoms.3
Concerns of women and girls are also co-extensive in the area of 
sexual violence in armed conflict.  During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, 
1 Women of color and Reproductive Freedom, 2001 (A Shadow Report), available at, 
http://lic.law.ufl.edu/~russellb/.
2 Alexandra Arriaga, HIV/AIDS and Violence Against Women, 29-SUM Hum. Rts. 18, 
19 (2002).
3 Id.
2003] 3
Rwandan girls and women were subjected to brutal forms of sexual 
violence.4  Rape was widespread.5  Some observers believe that almost 
every woman and adolescent girl who survived the genocide was raped 
(and, of course, we can never know how many of those who did not 
survive were subjected to rape before their deaths).6  The women and girls 
who were raped ranged in age from two to fifty years old.7  Surely the 
impact of the sexual violence was as profound on girls as it was on adult 
women.  
The hallmarks of both of these situations is the suffering or harm 
inflicted on females of all ages because of their gender.   There is a need 
for solidarity across the generations in righting the wrongs.  With respect to 
issues of health, poverty, sexual violence, armed conflict, economic 
subjugation, the dividing line between “woman” and “girl” is blurred.  
Females are persecuted because of gender, regardless of age, whether they 
are girls or women.  More generally, what women share with children in 
communities around the world is powerlessness.   Children may share 
women’s gender.  Women share children’s powerlessness.  They share the 
same destiny of suffering!  And my fear is that creating, perpetuating, and 
acknowledging a divide between the rights of women and those of children 
may result in the unnecessary alienation of the two groups and the 
consequent dilution of the ability of either to effectively address the issues 
faced by both.
However, after hearing the panel discussions that preceded my 
presentation at the workshop, I understood better the framework of the 
debate and the “tension” that was driving the workshop.  I understood that 
while, in theory, women’s and children’s rights are not necessarily 
antithetical, the policies that have been devised (allegedly to preserve and 
promote those rights) are at odds.  For example, the policy of social 
services to remove a child from the home of the mother, rather than assist 
both mother and child by the creation of a better home environment, is 
certainly at odds with rights of the mother.  To simplify the issue greatly, 
the right of women to have and raise a child is in conflict with the way that 
the state operates in its protective role - and a critical issue is that the state 
4 Human Rights Watch/Africa, Shattered Lives:  Sexual Violence During the Rwandan 
Genocide and its Aftermath (September 19960 [hereinafter, “Shattered Lives”], 
available at, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm.
5Id. 
6Id. 
7Id.
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might not be color-blind or race neutral.  This is an especially important 
issue for African-American women because the state feels compelled to 
intervene in their lives as they are at times presumptively seen as 
“irresponsible.”
With a better understanding of the question posed by the workshop, 
I thought about the role that a human rights discourse might play in 
addressing the “divide” or the debate, and I came up with preliminary 
questions.  What are the alternatives when it comes to the expression of 
rights?  Do we identify maternal or parental rights in negative terms, saying 
you can do anything not prohibited, or positive terms, saying you can do 
only that which specifically is permitted?  Does it matter?  But whether 
parental rights are viewed in terms of “parents have rights to do anything 
not prohibited” or “parents have rights to do only that which is specifically 
permitted,” children’s rights are left undefined.  Children remain on the 
margin.  Children are in the default position.  And this problem is 
exacerbated domestically, in the United States, by the view of some 
parental rights advocates that parents have omnipotent “rights” over 
children.  Under this view, rights of children may be not only marginalized, 
but rendered non-existent.  This view also begs any question or issue with 
respect to parental responsibility.
Perhaps the key to the harmonization of children’s and parent’s 
rights is the identification and enumeration of children’s rights, so that we 
can see where rights of parents and children intersect and are 
interdependent, and then and thereby develop policies that foster the rights
of both.  In the international human rights context, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Children’s Rights Convention)8 is an example of the 
harmonization of children’s and parent’s rights, and an analysis of the legal 
scheme developed by the Children’s Rights Convention might prove 
helpful to the debate.   
The Convention enumerates the following rights for children:  
• to life; 
• to a name; 
• to acquire a nationality; 
• to know and be cared for by his or her parents; 
• to preserve his or her identity; 
• to maintain personal relations and direct contact with one or both 
8 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
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parents if separated from them or if they reside in different states; 
•  to express views freely in all matters affecting them; 
•  to freedom of expression; 
• to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, association, and 
peaceful assembly; 
• to protection of the law against arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, and 
against unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation; 
• to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they 
are eligible and from social security, including social insurance; 
• to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and 
to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health; 
• to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral and social development; 
•  to education; 
• to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities 
appropriate to the age of the child and to participate freely in 
cultural life and the arts; and,
• to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing 
any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the 
child’s education or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral or social development.9
Acknowledging the interdependence of and the need for balance 
between rights of children and parental rights, Article 3(2) of the 
Convention provides that, in ensuring child protection, states parties shall 
take into account “the rights and duties of . . . parents.”10  Further, Article 
5 of the Convention, which is devoted to parental rights, provides that 
states parties, “shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents 
. . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the 
child of the rights recognized in the present Convention. “11 Finally, under 
Article 18 of the Children’s Rights Convention, “[p]arents . . . have the 
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child” 
and, in order to support this responsibility, states parties are required to 
“render appropriate assistance to parents . . . in the performance of their 
child- rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of
9 Id. at Articles 6-9, 12-16, 24, 26-28, and 31-32.
10 Id. at Article 3(2).
11 Id. at Article 5.
6 [Vol. 
institutions, facilities and services for the care of children.”12
In sum, the Children’s Rights Convention provides a good example 
of how a legal scheme, by specifically delineating the content of rights, 
here, children’s rights, and acknowledging the interdependence of and 
providing for a balance between rights, can respect the rights of children 
and parents.  In the future, I hope to more fully explore how women’s and 
children’s human rights reinforce one another.  Further, I would like to 
explore how the strand of feminism adopted, for example, African-
American feminism, affects whether and how a “divide” between women’s 
and children’s rights is perceived.  Perhaps the “divide” is an illusion and 
the reality of human rights is one of intersectionality and interdependence. 
12 Id. at Article 18(1) and (2).
